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LIFE INSURER LIABLE FOR DEATH CAUSED BY
BENEFICIARY WITHOUT INSURABLE
INTEREST IN DECEDENT'
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon,
100 So. 2d 696 (1la. 1957)
It has been generally held that a life insurance policy, procured by
and for the benefit of one without an interest in the life of the person
insured, is illegal and void as against public policy.1 While such policies
have been characterized as wagers or as contracts which tend to promote
crime, the insurable interest rule has been limited in its application to
actions which have tested the contractual obligation of the insurer toward
the beneficiary. In the present case, the Alabama Supreme Court was
presented with a situation which directly involved the underlying policies
of the rule.2
Mrs. Dennison procured life insurance policies from the three
defendant companies on the life of her two-year-old niece by marriage,
Shirley Weldon. Mrs. Dennison designated herself as beneficiary. It
was proved that the three insurers knew, or failed to exercise reasonable
diligence to ascertain, that Mrs. Dennison lacked an insurable interest
in the life of her niece.' Shortly after Mrs. Dennison acquired the
policies, she murdered her niece by administering arsenic. Mrs. Dennison
was convicted of murder in the first degree4 and was executed.' The
decedent's father brought suit against the three companies under the
Alabama Wrongful Death Act.6 The theory of the plaintiff's case was
that the issuance of the policies by the insurers constituted negligence
which. contributed to the child's death because the policies furnished an
incentive to commit murder. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff
I Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911) ; Geisler v. Mutual Benefit Health
and Accident Ass'n., 163 Kans. 518, 183 P.2d 853 (1947); Ryan v. Rotweiler,
50 Ohio St. 595, 35 N.E. 679 (1893). 1 CoucH, INSURANCE §295 (1929); PATrEra-
SON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW §§22, 34, (1935); VANCE, INSURANCE §28 (3d
ed. 1951); Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life, 18 COLUM. L. REv. 381 (1918).
Further cases are collected at 1 CoucH, op. cit supra at 767, n. 5 (1929);
Insurance, Key Number 119, Decennial Digest.
2 Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1957).
This case was originally brought in the Alabama court, removed to the
federal court, and then remanded to the state court. The action against the non-
resident insuier was held not to be a "separate and independent claim" under
62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1441(c) (1952). Weldon v. Liberty National Life
Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 315, 1 CCH Life Cases 2d 422 (M.D. Ala. 1953).
3 Under the Alabama insurable interest rule, neither an aunt nor an aunt
by marriage has an insurable interest in her niece by reason of relationship.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947).
4 Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424, 66 So. 2d 552 (1953).
5 N.Y. TMES, Sept. 4, 1953, p. 9, col. 1.
6 ALA. CoDE, tit. 7, §§119, 123 (1940).
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of $75,000,' The Alabama Supreme Court held that the duty upon
all persons to exercise reasonable care not to injure others requires life
insurance companies to exercise reasonable care not to issue a life policy
to one who has no interest in the insured. The insurer's negligence was
held to be the proximate cause of the insured's death, notwithstanding
the intervening criminal act of Mrs. Dennison.
8
As noted above, the insurable interest rule with respect to life
insurance is that a policy procured by one without an interest in the life
insured, where the procurer is also the beneficiary, is void.' However,
the courts have usually held that the lack of insurable interest is a question
which can be raised only by the insurer.1" An English case construing
the Life Assurance Act of 177411 held that as between the creditors of
the insured and the beneficiary, the beneficiary prevailed. 12 While the
insurer could have contested its obligation to pay the beneficiary, no
other interested party was allowed to contest the beneficiary's right to
keep the proceeds."3 It is implicit, therefore, that the insurer is free to
waive the defense and pay over the proceeds. In several instances, inter-
pleader suits have been initiated by the insurer seeking a determination
of the ownership of the proceeds.14 However, if the insurer elects not
7Id. at §119. Under the Alabama act, the plaintiff's measure of damages is
"such damages as the jury may assess.. ." The jury is properly instructed that due
regard should be given "to the necessity of preventing similar wrongs." Mobile
Light & R. Co. v. Nicholas, 232 Ala. 213, 222, 167 So. 298, 305 (1936).
8This aspect of the case will not be treated here, aside from posing this
question: Isn't foreseeing death the business of a life insurer?
9 There are four personalities who can be involved in a life insurance
policy: (1) the cestui que vie, or the life insured, (2) the procurer of the policy
from the insurer, (3) the insurer, and (4) the beneficiary. In the usual case
where the insurable interest rule bars recovery, the procurer and the beneficiary
are the same person.
10 Baker v. Keet-Rountree Dry Goods Co., 318 Mo. 962, 2 S.W.2d 733
(1928); Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N.E.2d 299 (1912).
1 CoucH, INSURANCE §295 at 722 (1929); VANCE, INSURANCE §31, at 199 (3d ed.
1951). 29 AM. JuR., Insurance §320 (1940); -44 C.J.S., Insurance §212 (1945).
Further cases are collected under Insurance, Key Number 117, Decennial Digest.
See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1276 (1948).
11 14 GEO. 111 c. 48.
12NVorthington v. Curtis, [1875] 1 Ch. 419 (C.A.). This result has been
generally followed in the United States with the exception of Texas. Langford v.
Freeman, 60 Ind. 46 (1877); Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 106 Mich.
138, 63 N.W. 897 (1895) ; Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., supra note 10. Contra,
Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S.W. 274 (1894).
13 In Texas the insurer is required to pay the proceeds to the estate of
the insured. This equitable result denies the procurer the benefits of the policy
while upholding the insurer's agreement. Cheeves v. Anders, supra note 12.
Section 146(1) of the N.Y. INs. LAW gives the insured or his representatives
the right to recover the proceeds from the beneficiary, but apparently only if the
insurer has paid.
14 Bynum v. Prudential Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.S.C. 1948) ; Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Morris, 115 N.J.Eq. 142, 169 Atl. 835 (1934); Keckley v. Coshocton
Glass Co., supra note 10.
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to pay the proceeds, the defense has not been waived by the issuance of
the policy, nor is the insurer estopped to deny the lack of an insurable
interest, and the beneficiary cannot compel payment.' 5 These rules
illustrate a difference in the importance given the insurable interest rule.
If the insurer is allowed to pay the -proceeds, the rule appears to be
merely a technical defense; if, however, the insurer is allowed to raise
the defense notwithstanding a waiver or estoppel, the rule appears to
embody a mandatory principle of public policy.
In a suit by the beneficiary to recover premiums, a number of juris-
dictions allow recovery on the theory that the insurer should not be
allowed to retain premiums where no insurable risk attached.'" Other
cases deny recovery on the ground that the parties were in pari delcto,
and the courts will not lend their aid to the parties to an illegal transac-
tion." Recovery of premiums often turns on the issue of bad faith on
the part of the procurer or the insurer."8 Here again, if the rule is a
technical insurer's defense, the beneficiary will not recover; if the rule
is an overriding policy, then the beneficiary recovers in the absence of
any bad faith on his part.
With the development of insurance regulation 'by the states, one
other relevant question arose under the insurable interest rule. Many
states require that a life insurance policy contain a clause to the effect
that the insurer will not contest its liability after a stated period. 9 With
one short-lived and notorious exception,2" the courts nevertheless allow
the insurer to defend after the policy has become incontestable on the
grounds of lack of an insurable interest in the beneficiary. 2 1 The approach
here is that a policy which is void from the beginning cannot become
binding -by mere lapse of time, and the incontestable clause does not
preclude asserting that the contra& is void. While the rule remains an
insurer's defense, the lack of an insurable interest in a policy which
contains an incontestable clause leads the courts to characterize the policy
as void ab initio.
Thus a large number of jurisdictions describe a policy where the
15 1 COUCH, INSURANCE §295 (1929); VANCE, INSURANCE §85 (3d ed. 1951).
29 AM. JUR., Insurance §§320, 321 (1940).
16 Washington v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 175 tenn. 529, 136 S.W.2d 493
(1940). 3 COUCH, INSURANCE §735 (1929); VANCE, INSURANCE §58 (3d ed. 1951).
29 AM. JuR., Insurance §4-54 (1940); 44 C.J.S., Insurance §§405, 407 (1945).
17 American Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 39 Ind. App. 215, 79 N.E.
526 (1906); Ely v. Oakland Circuit Judge, 162 Mich. 466, 125 N.W. 375,
modified on rehearing, 127 N.W. 769 (1910).
Is See Annot., 129 A.L.R. 57, 70-83 (1940).
19 VANCE, INSURANCE §97 (3d ed. 1951).
2OSun Life Assur. Co. v. Allen, 270 Mich. 272, 259 N.W. 281 (1935);
Bogacki v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 253 Mich. 253, 234 N.W. 865 (1931).
21 See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 1040, 1046 (1947); 35 A.L.R. 1491 (1925); 13
A.L.R. 674 (1921); 6 A.L.R. 448, 452 (1920).
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beneficiary does not have an insurable interest as "void," "illegal," "con-
trary to public policy," and "pernicious." Nevertheless, few of them
have held the insurable interest rule to be more than a narrow rule of
insurance law.
22
Even in those jurisdictions which treat the insurable interest rule
as a principle of public policy, the opinions are not dear as to which
rationale for the rule was paramount. The two underlying reasons
commonly given are that such a policy is a wagering contract23 and a
contract which induces people to commit crime.2 4 These two reasons
are closely related. The legitimate beneficiary, because of his emotional
or pecuniary relationship with the insured, is primarily interested in the
continued life of the insured, and regards the possibility of his death as
a peril against which he protects himself with insurance. On the other
hand, the beneficiary without an insurable interest suffers no emotional
or pecuniary loss on the death of the insured; his interest is solely in
the proceeds of the policy. The arrangement will be more profitable the
sooner the insured dies. To say that such policies are wagers is to say
that persons who bet on the lives of strangers might be moved to win
the wager by truncating the stranger's life.
The cases clearly indicate that the notion of preventing murder
is the more significant. In the situation where the insured himself pro-
cures the policy and designates as beneficiary one who lacks an insurable
interest in his life, the beneficiary is allowed to recover the proceeds over
the objection of the insurer.25 The reason generally given is that the
insured is a capable judge of those whom he will trust. "The selection
of the beneficiary . . . will sufficiently protect the insured."2 If an
aversion to wagering contracts were the primary basis for denying recov-
22See 11 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. RaV. 239 (1956).
23 The origin of the wagering basis appears to be the Life Assurance Act,
14 Gao. III c. 48 (1774). The preamble to this statute states: "Whereas it hath
been found by experience that the making insurances on lives or other events
wherein the assured shall have no interest hath introduced a mischievious kind
of gaming . . . ." The outrageous insuring of notable invalids and condemned
convicts is described in WRIGHT AND FAYLE, A HISTORY OF LLOYD'S 93-96 (1927).
A contract between two Englishmen on the life of Napoleon Bonaparte was
litigated in Gilbert v. Sykes, 16 East. 149, 104 Eng. Repr. 1045 (1812).
24The murder rationale was articulated by Holmes: "The chance that
in some case [the policy] may prove a sufficient motive for crime is greatly
enhanced if the whole world of the unscrupulous are free to bet on what life
they choose." Grigsby v. Russell, supra note 1. Patterson minimizes the murder
rationale by noting the severe criminal sanction and the uncollectability of the
proceeds by a murderer. PATrERSoN, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW §34 (1935).
Both ideas ignore the beneficiary's working assumption: he won't be caught.
2
r
5 Grigsby v. Russell, supra note 1; Reed v. Provident Savings Life Assur.
Soc., 190 N.Y. 111, 82 N.E. 734 (1907); Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n. v.
Jones, 154 Pa. 99, 26 At. 253 (1893). VANCE, INSURANCE §31 at 188-89 (3d ed.
1951).
26 VANCE, INSURANCE §31 at 189 (3d ed. 1951).
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cry, it would not matter who procured the policy. 7
The Alabama court in the instant case, consistently with this general
line of reasoning, felt that the insurable interest rule should serve as a
standard of insurer conduct.
The defendants seem to be of the opinion that the insurable
interest rule is to protect insurance companies. We do not agree.
The rule is designed to protect human life. Policies in violation
of the insurable interest rule are not dangerous because they
are illegal, they are illegal because they are dangerous.
As we have shown, it has long been recognized by this
court and practically all courts in this country that an insured
is placed in a position of extreme danger where a policy of
insurance is issued on his life in favor of a beneficiary who has
no insurable interest. There is no legal justification for the
creation of such a risk to an insured and there is no social gain
in the writing of a void policy of insurance. Where this court
has found that such policies are unreasonably dangerous to the
insured because of the risk of murder and for this reason has
declared such policies void, it would be an anomaly to hold that
insurance companies have no duty to use reasonable care not
to create a situation which may prove to be a stimulus for
murder.
2 8
Previous implementation of the insurable interest rule did not expose the
insurer to any substantial risk of financial loss. Raising the insurable
interest rule to a standard of conduct to which insurers must adhere
will undoubtedly have sharp repercussions in two areas: tort liability and
sales activity. There is no doubt that the insured could maintain an action
for -personal injuries inflicted by the beneficiary in attempting to murder
the insured. The Alabama opinion does not appear to be limited to life
insurance; the property. owner should 'be able to assert a similar claim
for damage inflicted on his property by a beneficiary without an insurable
interest. While it is probable that overly energetic selling activity has
been lessened by prior use of the rule, insurers will undoubtedly take
steps to avoid writing such policies. The basic problem in the sales area
appears to be the determination of what must be done to satisfy "reason-
able diligence." 9
While adoption of a technical rule of insurance law as a standard
of conduct in tort may be novel it does not seem improper to expect
life insurers to refrain from issuing "void and illegal" policies which
serve to induce crimes of violence.
I. Doneld Cairns
27 Even when the beneficiary has an insurable interest, the insured 'mut
consent to the policy or it is invalid. VANsCE, INSURANCE §34 (3d ed. 1951).
2SLiberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co, v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696, 708 (1957).
25 One of the agents in the instant case testified that he did not know
whether the policy was in violation of the company's rules even though his instroe"
tion book did not include an ant or an aunt-in-law as "acceptable beneficiaries."
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